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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
SURGICAL SUPPLY CENTER, INC.
a corporation; PROPES S I 0 N A L
PHARMACY, INC., a corporation,
et al
Plaintiffs and Petitioners,
vs.

. Case No. 7390

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,
Defendants .

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF·
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 14, 1948, identical letters were directed to the
Surgical Supply Center, Inc. and Professional Pharmacy, Inc.,
two Utah corporations, by a representative in the Utah Department of Employment Security, notifying them that their contribution rates beginning October 1, 1947, (the date when each
corporation commenced operations) would be 2. 7 percent.
3
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On May 24,- 1948, the company, through its attorney,
requested an extension of time in which to file a formal appe~l.
The request was granted, and on June 5, 1948, a written appeal
was directed to the Department. The matter was received by
the Appeals Referee on June 14, 1948, and on August 31,
1948, written notices of the time and place of hearing were
directed to the parties. On September 1, 1948, the companies
requested a postponement of the hearing. The request .was
granted, and the matter was set for September 14, 1948, but was
further postponed and was heard on September 22, 1948. The
Appeals Referee, in his decision, dated September 23, 1948,
affirmed the deterr:nination of the Department.
On September 30, 1948, the two corporations appealed
to the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah
under the provisions of Section 42-=2a_-10, Utah Code Annotated
1943, as amended by Chapter 53, Laws of Utah, 1949. On
the 17th day of August, 1949, the Board of Review issued its
decision denying any further hearing and thereby sustaining
the decision of the Appeals Referee.
On the 27th day of August, 1949, the Surgical Supply
Center and Professional Pharmacy filed a Petition for Writ
of Review in this court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In December, 1938, Mr. James F. Robinson became the
sole owner of the Professional Pharmacy in Salt Lake City,
and in November, 1942, he also became owner of the Surgical
Supply Center in Salt Lake City. On January 3, 1944, Robinson
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entered -into a p~rtnership agreement with two of his employees who were each given 10 percent interest in the con1bined business of the Surgical Supply Center and the Profes'"
sional Phannacy. Each of the two undertakings, the Surgical
Suppiy Center and the Professional Pharmacy, maintained a
separate set of books, records and accounts and had a separate
bank account and was operated as a separate unit. The profits
to the partners were distributed on the basis of the combined
income from the two operating units.
On October 1, 1947, a bill of sale signed by the partners
transferred the assets of the Surgical Supply Center to the
Surgical Supply Center, Incorporated, a Utah corporation,
and at the same time by means of another bill of sale signed
by the partners, the assets of the Professional Pharmacy were
transferred to the Professional Pharmacy, Incorporat~d, a Utah
corporation. The proportionate interests of the former partners
ren1ained the same except that there were two other individuals
who each held one share of stock in each corporation.

DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT
NEITHER THE SURGICAL SUPPLY CENTER, IN-CORPORATED, NOR THE PROFESSIONAL PHARMACY,
INCORPORATED, WERE QUALIFIED EMPLOYERS
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY ACT ON OCTOBER 1, 1947, SINCE NEITHER
ACQUIRED ALL OR SUBSTANTIALLY ALL TH~ ASSETS
OF THE PREDECESSOR EMPLOYER (THE _PARTNERSHIP).
_5
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. For some years-prior to 1947 the Utah Employment Security
Act, Chapter 42-2a, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended,
contained no provision for reduced rates for employers for the
purpose of paying unemployment compensation contributions.
The Act merely provided as follows:
Section

42-2a~ 7 (b)

( 2), Utah Code Annotated 1943.

tc(b) (2) Each employer shall pay contributions
equal to 2. 7 percent of wages paid by him during the
calendar year 1941 and during each calendar year thereafter with respect to employment occurring after December 31, 1940."
Section 7 of the Act provided for a study of experience
rating.
The 1947 legislature enacted Chapter 56, Laws of Utah,
1947, providing two employer experience rating formulre.
Section 42-2a-7(b) was amended by adding:
3) Each employer shall, except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, pay contributions equal to
2.7 percent of wages paid by him during the calendar
years or portion thereof occurring after June 30, 1947,
and prior to January 1, 1950.
u (

4) Each employer shall, except as provided in ·subsection (d) of this section; pay contributions equal to
2. 7 percent of the wages paid by him during each of the
calendar years occurring after December 31, 1949."
«« (

The court's attention is called to the fact that ( 3) above
quoted provides for a system of rates for the period commencing July 1, 1947, and ending December 31, 1949, and that ( 4)
provi9es for a system of rating to go into effect for the years
6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

after_ Decem~ 31,.- 1949. .The f:Ou-rt's attention is :called to
Chapter 53, Laws of Utah 1949, which, among other things,
amended Section 42-2a-7 by changing the· above. quoted paragraph ( 3) of subsection (b) to· read as .follows:
tt ( 3) Each employer shall, except as provided in
.subsection (c) of this section, pay contributions·.equal
to 2.7 percent of wages paid by him during the calendar
years or portion thereof occurring after June 30, 1947."
Paragraph ( 4) above quoted was deleted from the section
so that the system of rates, successorship, etc., which was
previously provided to take effect January 1, 1950, was deleted
from the Act, and the system-as established in subsection. (c) ,
with some amendments, remains· in effect after December 31,
1949. The Act, therefore, ·establishes a standard rate for the
payment of contributions, ( 3) set out above, ·equal to 2.7
percent of wages.
~

Section 42-2a-7 (c), Utah Code Annotated 1943, as
amended by C~apter 56, Laws of Utah, 1947, established a
formula whereby ttqualified employers" who met certain conditions set forth there would pay a rate less than 2. 7 percent.
(c) ( 1) (C) defined qualified employer as:.
(((C) 'Qualified employer' means any employer who:
was an employer as 'defined in this act during each of
the thirteen consecutive calendar quarters imnl.ediately
preceding the computation date; and had employment
in each of the three completed calendar years immediately preceding the computation date; and/- v1ith.
respect to such three calendar years had :fi_l~d. all contribution reports prescribed ·by. the Commt.ss1on;. ~?-~
'. ~..:. :;. · · ( excepf for ·amounts due ·as determined pursuant ·to
7
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· audit or as set forth on a notice of contribution deficiency prepared by the Commission and pertaining
to the quarter ending December 31 immediately preceding the computation date) had paid all contributions
thereon by the cut-off date. If an employer has acquired
all or substantially all the assets of another employer
and such other employer had discontinued operations
upon such acquisition, the period of liability of both
employers during such period shall be jointly considered
for_ all purposes of t4is section."
We find, therefore, that in order to· have been classified
as a ((qualified employer" so that the experience raing formula
would be applied as of July 1, 1947-the first rate reduction
applying only to the last six months of 1947-any employer
must ( 1) have been an employer as defined in the Act during
each of the 13 consecutive calendar quarters immediately
preceding the computation date (the first computation date
being January 1, 1947); (2) the employer must have had employment in each of the three completed calendar years immediately preceding the computation date; (3) the employer
with respect to such three calendar years must have filed all
contribution reports prescribed by the Commission; and ( 4)
the employer must have paid all contributions thereon by the
cut-off date Cc ccut-off date' means April 30 with respect to
contribution rates effective for the period July 1, 1947, to
December 31, 1947, and thereafter February 15 next following
the computation date").
Or in the case where an employer acquired all or substantially all the assets of another employer,· the period of liability
of both employers during the 13 consecutive calendar quarters
preceding the computation date, would be jointly considered
. 8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

for all purposes of Section 7 provided it was shown. that the
predecessor employer had discontinued operations upon such
acquisition.
It can be adn1itted that had the partnership continued
operating the Surgical Supply Center and the Professional
Pharmacy, it would have continued to be a qualified employer
as it was on July 1, 1947. It may also be admitted that had the
partnership transferred all of .the assets of the two operating
units to a single corporation and the partnership had discontinued operations, the successor corporation would have succeeded to the reduced rate \vhich \vithout such transfer would
have been attributable to the partnership.
(It is unnecessary to discuss the formula inasmuch as the
question of the method of its application is not in issue in this
matter. It appears to be sufficient to state that rates are computed upon the basis of the percentage decrease of annual payrolls over the 3-year period; the percentage decrease of quarterly
payrolls over the 3-year peroid; and the length of time_ the
employer was subject to the Act).
Some 38 states have passed statutes providing for the
transfer of merit rating to successors in certain cases. Of these,
4 states have provided that an acquisition ttof all or a part
thereof'' was sufficient to establish successorship; 13 states
require an acquisition of ((substantially all"; and 18 states
allow successorship .only if the trade, business, or nail" of the
assets of the predecessor were acquired.
The 1949 Legislature, Chapter 53, Laws of Utah 194-9~
added to the above-quoted subsection ( 7) (c) the following
language:

9
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((If an employer has ·acquir.ed a clearly segregable
and identifiable part of another employer's enterprise,
the period of liability attributable to such transferred
part of an employers' enterprise shall be considered
jointly with the period of liability . of the acquiring
employer for all purposes of this section, provided, that
the acquiring employer's rate for the period beginning
with the date_ of the transfer and ending with the next
following effective date ·of contribution rates shall be
that rate which is assigned pursuant to the regulations
of the Commission adopted under the provisions of
this section, which provide for the transfer of a rate
by an employer to his successor.
((An employer who transfers all or a segregable part
of his operations from another state to this state shall
be deemed to te a (qualified employer' within the
meaning of this _section as of the computation date
next following the transfer, provided: that he has paid
wages subject to the federal unemployment tax act for
tv1elve consecutive completed calendar quarters immeditely preceding the computation date; that he
notifies the commission of the transfer of operations
prior to the computation date; that he certifies to the
Commission all information with respect to the transferred operations which the Commission determines
to be necessary. (Wages,' paid in connection with such
· transferred operations shall be deemed to have been
paid in this state for the purposes of this section."
There can be no validity, however, in an argument that
this 1949 am-endment was retroactive to July 1, 1947, and
the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 3rd Judicial
Department, on December 29, 1948, so held, in effect when
interpreting a similar amendment in the case of the Newspaper P.M., Inc., Marshall Field and Marshall Field, Jr., individually,- doing business as Field Publications vs. Edward Corsi,
10
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Industrial Commissioner (CCH N.Y. Paragraph 8520.)
court stated:

The

uPrior to 19.:17 the requirements for qualification for
credit made no provision for and did not include an
employer's discontinuance of operations upon his disposal and another's consequent acquisition qf a severable part of his business activities.. That the equity
and fairness of so doing was recently recognized and
provided for (quoting New York Court, changes)
does not permit us to make that measure retroactive.
~fo uphold appellant's contention we would, in effe~t,
be doing that. The liberal construction contended for
Vlould register the legislative grant of a new right
superfluous. The remedial nature of a new right besto,ved affords it no retroactive reach. (Jacobus vs.
Colgate, 217 N. Y. 235) ."
The court held that 1fr. Field, when he disposed of his
P.1tL Newspaper business to the Field Publications a-nd continued in the newspaper business of publishing the ChicagoSun, and in connection therewith, continued in New York
City the maintenance of a news gathering and transmitting
organization, did not discontinue operations within the meaning
of the applicable statute in 1942, the date of the transfer.
We again call this court's attention to the fact that the
1947 Utah statute contained a similar provision that a successor
could not succeed to the experience of the predecessor unless
"such other ernployer had discontinued operations upon such
acquisition." (Sec. (7) (c).) It is our position that the Utah
statute establishes a standard rate of contributions of 2. 7 percent and that it is a well-settled principle of law that in order
to take advantage of a statutory provision (for any reduction
11
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in rate) .:the;. employer must prove to the satisfaction of . the
administering body that it has met all of the statutory specifications. The statute is to be const.rued as written, having in
mind its evident purpose, whether the end result is considered
by some to be economically good or bad.
The statute, as it existed on July 1, 1947, was an integral
part of the statute just as is the 1949 amendment permitting
the transfer of merit rating in the case where an employer
acquires a clearly segregable and identifiable part of another
employer's enterprise. (55. Yale L. J. 218, 242). Also, there
can be no merit to the argument that the Surgical Supply Company and Professional Pharmacy prior to their incorporation
were separate employing units.
Section 42-2a-19, Utah Code Annotated 1943, defines_
employing unit as follows:
(h) (Employing unit' means any individual or type
of organization, including any partnership, association,
trust, estate, joint stock ccr:-~pany, insurance company
or corporatioh, vY"hether don1estic or foreign, or the
··receiver, ·trustee in bankruptcy, trustee or successor
of any ·of the foregoing, or the legal representative
of a deceased person, which has or subsequent to
January 1, 1935, had one or more individuals performing services for it within this state.
cc

cc (

1) All individuals performing services within this

· state for any employing unit which maintains two or
more. separate establishments within this state shall
be deemed to be performing services for a single
employing unit for all the purposes of this act.

(( ( 2) Each i!ldividual employed · to perform or to
assist in . performing the work of any persori in the

12
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service of an employing unit shall be deemed -to be
engaged by such employing unit for all the purposes
of this act whether such individual was hired or paid
directly by such employing unit or by such person,
provided the employing unit had actual or constructive
knowledge of the "'ork."
As set forth in the above-quoted section, all of the individuals performing services in the two separate establis~ments
were deemed to be performing services for the general partnership, which, 'vithin the above definition was the tcemploying ·
unit."· Any rate computations which were made were made
on the basis of the combined payrolls of the separate operating
units. Under the provisions of the Act, the separate operating
units were not considered as having earned a reduced rate.
The New Hampshire Employment Security Act prior
to April 30, 1945, contained no ·provision for the transfer of
experience rating, but effective April 30, 1945, the law was
amended to permit a transfer of rates. In the case of C. A.
Lund & Compa1;1y vs. Rolfe, 93 N. H. 280, 41 A. (2d) 226
( 1945) , dealing with the period prior to the amendment, ·
which became effective- April 30, 1945, the court held that
' a partnership which took over the business of the corporation
was not entitled to the merit rating record of the corporation
for purposes of computing the partnership's _unemployment
compensation contribution rate even though the members of
the partnership consisted of 4 of the 6 stockholders of the
former corporation and no change in personnel or type of
business conducted took place at the time the partnership
took over the business of the corporation.
13
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The New Hampshire court further held, in the case of
Sulloway, et al vs. Rolfe, 47 A: ( 2d) 109 ( 1946), that where
a member of a partnership died and was replaced by a new
member, a new employing unit was thereby created and therefore such employing unit was not entitled to pay unemployment
compensation contributions at a rate based upon the combined
experience of it and its predecessor even though the partner
had agreed that in the event of death or resignation of any
partner, the remaining partners would continue the practice
of law together as partners and that the partnership should
not terminate because of such death or resignation.
In the case of Seavey Hardware Company vs. Riley, 95
N. H .... , 67 A. (2d) 430, decided June 28, 1949, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court held that a purchaser of one of
two hardware stores owned by a partnership was not entitled
to the merit rating of the partnership under the Unemployment
Compensation Law since the store purchased did not constitute substantially all of the assets of the partnership. The
court overruled the contention that the partnership cotnprised
two employing units and that each of them was an employer
under ,the law. In answer to the contention of the plaintiff that
the partnership comprised two employing units, one the Seavey
Hardware Company, and the other Young's Hardware Store,
and that each of these units was itself an ttemployer" under
the Act, the court said:
ttThis argument ignores the express provtston contained in subsection 1-G: (All individuals performing
services within this state for any employing unit which
J!laintains two or more separate establishments within
the state shall be deemed to be employed b_y a single

14
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·_,:

·employing unit for all purposes of this .chapter.' The
Fountain partnership, although it had two separate
stores or establishments in Dover and Exeter respectively, was a single employing_ unit and so one.
employer. Cartersville Candlewick vs. Huiet, 50 S. E.
( 2d) (Ga.) 64 7. It is clear that the terms of subsection
1-G in the definition of an employing unit expressly
include a partnership and neither expressly nor PY
implication refer to a store in and of itself as an em~
playing unit. The Dover store itself was not an enF
playing unit or employer within the meaning of the
Act and had no merit rating that could be acquired
by Thomas C. Dunnington.
ttThe plaintiffs position is· fallacious 'in stating that
the Seavey Hardware Company was one employing
unit and. that the other was· Young's Hardware Store.
Employing unit is defined in terms of the individual or
type of organization behind a trade or business rather
than in terms of the physical units and the econ9mic
features of the enterprise. In Sulloway vs. Rolfe,
supt~'-, 87, the theory that an employing unit was the
same because the organization qf a certain .law office
was the same aud it was fair to say that there was identity of enterprise and other business and economic .
factors, was reje~ted. It \vas held that since there was
a change in the_ personnel of the partnership, the employing unit was new and that under the statute as
it. then was, the new partnership was not entitled to
the merit rating of the predecessor. So, in the present
case the contention that the Dover Store was an employing unit, cannot be accepted. The employing unit
was the Fountain partnership, which also owned· the··
store in Exeter. It has sometimes been stated that the
phrase c employing unit' is defined in terms of the
venturer rather than of the venture. By ernploying
urut is meant the master rather than the servants, the
owner rather than the ·business, the- one ultimately
liable for the obligations of· the organizatiohs~

15
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cCThe claim of the plaintiff that the defendant cshould
have divided Fountain's account .into two sections, one
applicable to each establishment,' is error. The statute
provides for a separate account for e4ch employer and
accordingly for a separate rating for each . . . These
· ·merit rating accounts are not severable, nor can a part
·of the account of the transferor be carried forward by
the.~uccessor. ·Cartersville Candlewick ys. Huiet, supra;
_Ned's Auto Supply Company vs. Commission, 313
Mich. 66; El Queeno Distributing Company vs.
Christgau, 221 1Yfinn. 197. The accounts and ratings
cannot be multiplied to correspond to the severable
portions of an etnployer' s organization, trade, or business, either during his ownership or at the time of
acquisition of a porLon by another or others. If the
requirements of subsection 6-F are complied with, the
successor gains the n1erit rating of the transferor.
Otherwise, he gets no such rating with his transfer.
The Act does not contemplate the great burden that
would be cast . upon the defendant by holding that
accounts should correspond to establishments rather
than to employers. Also, no provision is. made for
dividing a merit rating at the time of the acquisition
of a part of the assets of an employer so that two shall
be created out of the one that existed . . . For each
busiii.ess, account and merit rating, there is but one
employer although he may operate more than one
establishment; for each employer, only one set of
contributions as required."
(The court. then proceeded to set out the definition of
employing unit,. which corr_esponds to the definition of employing unit in the Utah Act).
-Similarly, under the Utah Act, there is in the instant case
only a single employer, the general partnership, which, until
the time ofthe:incotporation on or about October 1, 1947, had
16
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one account and one n1erit rate (or would have had a merit
rate had it continued in operation after Septen1ber 30, 1947).
It is a matter of historical record that Section (7) (c) of
the statute, and particularly that portion defining a nqualified
employer,'' hereinabove quoted, was copied verbatim from
the New York statute as it existed at the time of the 1947
legislative amendment. It is also true that since the Utah
statute established a method of reduced rates for employers
a number of years after most of the other states had expeuenced
a rate reduction, we are compelled to rely upon decisions of
those other states in interpreting similar provisions in the U tab
Act. The New York Act provided:
HI£ an employer· has acquired all or substantially all
the assets of another employer and such other employer
_has discontinued operations on such acquisition, the
period of liability of both employers during such period
shall be jointly considered for all purposes of this
section.''
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division 3rd
Department, 275, Appellate Division 881, decided 11ay 4,
1949, held that a corporation which was engaged in the manufacture of radio and telephone parts and which operated a laboratory and a patent divisiop in connection therewith and which
transferred to one of its subsidiaries all of the assets ·used in con.;
nection with its laboratory division and retained the assets used
in connection with its patent division was held not entitled to
transfer its contribution rate to such successor. Although the
corporation transferred substantially all of its assets; it failed
17
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

t.o. discontinue:~ business -operations. and ·.thus failed to :comply
with at least one condition necessary to permit .the transfer
of its rate credit. The court said:
~-

'

·The legislature did ·not iri.tend to authorize the
'transfer· of credits allowed to a qualified· employer to
anyone except his successor in business who had ac-.
quir~d al_l or substantially all of his assets, and then
only if the qualified employer had ceased all business
operations."'.'
cc

•

•

. So that this court may understand the term ntransfer of
· credits," the N:ew. York statute sets up a procedure whereby
3:t the enq of a rate year the employer is. given a credit or cash
refund which will, of course, be applied on future contributions, etc. The. Utah Act does not provide for extra credits.
It provides that in the succeeding year the qualified employer
will pay a rate less than 2. 7 percent. So also did the New
York court rule in the case of the Matter of the Application
for a Contribution Rate Credit Under Section 577 of the
Unemployt;nept Insurance Law by Hinzmann and Waldmann,
I~~., Appellant vs. Edward Corsi, Industrial Commissioner,
qeci~ed Pecember 29, 1948, 274 App. Div. 1009. In this
case the court decided that the appellant, one of two corporations formed to take the business of a partnership, did not
acquire substantially all of the assets of the former partnership
ven'ture where the total assets of the partnership at the time
of the transfer were $523,117.89 and the appellant acquired
only $129,938.98, and therefore that the appellant was not
entitled to a tax credit for the year in which the transfer took
plac:~.. The only question which, was presented in that case
VI~ th..e one: as to whether or . not the appellant was a ccqualified
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employer, as defined in the New
were as follows:

'Xork Act.

Briefly, the facts

For some time prior to April, 1946, Albert 0. Hinzmann
and Anton Waldmann, as co-partners, were engaged in business
as joiners and woodworkers. In addition to that venture, the
partners, commencing Noyember, -1944, and continuing until
April, 1946, engaged in the business of repairing ships. In
April, 1946, the partners determined to incorporate their business and form two corporations for that purpose. The appellant is one of the two corporations, and the partnership
transferred to it that portion of the partnership assets carried
on the partnership books as the woodworking assets. The
portion of the business relating to the ship repairing was
transferred to a corporation known as the Hinzmann & Waldmann Marine Corporation. The section of the New York Law
which was involved was the one hereinbefore set forth dealing
with the acquisition of the assets of another employer. Hinzmann and Waldmann, Inc., filed a motion for leave to appeal
from the above decision. These defendants are advised by
the State of New York that after consideration of the briefs
filed pursuant to the motion for leave to appeal, the motion
was denied.
So, in the instant case, neither the Surgical Supply Center,
Incorporated, a corporation, nor the Professional Pharmacy,
Incorporated, a corporation, acquired substantially all of the
assets of the general partnership and neither did they acquire
a majority of the assets.
In a very recent case decided by the New Hampshire
Supreme Court on November 1, 1949, Auclair Transportation,
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Inc., vs. William Riley, Commissioner of Labor, it was held
that a corporation which was formed to take over the business
of a tn.lcking company was n~t entitled. to the predecessor
employer's reduced rate where substantially all of the predecessor's assets were not transferred to the successor corporation.
The court said:
"The relation between the value of the trucking
business transferred and the value of the gasoline station retained is not so small from either an accounting
or practical viewpoint that v.;e can say as a matter of
law that substantially all of the assets of the business
. . . were acquired by the plaintiff."
In the Auclair case the facts were that W. M~ Auclair
owned and operated a motor vehicle trucking business, doing
business as W. M. Auclair Transportation, and also operated
a gasoline station for the sale of gasoline and allied products.
In the trucking business he employed approximately 25 persons,
and in the .gasoline station he generally had 3 employees. The
book value of the trucking business was set up at some $34,000
and the book value of the gasoline station was set up at some
$4,000. He transferred the trucking operation on January 1,
1945, to the Auclair Transportation, Inc. He retained possession and ownership of the gasoline station and continued
to operate the same. The court said:
nThe issue in this case is whether the plaintiff is
entitled to the employer merit rating of W. M. Auclair
upon the transfer described in the agreed facts. The
unemployment compensation statute provides that the
experience rating of an employer may be transferred
to ~an employing unit which acquires the organization,
trade, or business, or substantially all the assets thereof'
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t'(We are not concerned with the logic~! and . economic
questions for and against experience rating or merit
rating as it is usually described in this state (55 Yale
L. J. 218, 242), since it is an integral part of the
statute. Following the decisions in the Lund vs. Rolfe,
93 N.H. 280, and Sulloway vs. Rolfe, 94 N.H. 85,
the quoted statute also made the transfer of m~rit
rating for unemployment compensation contribution to
successor employing units (Note 60 Harv. L. Rev. 276)
an integral part of the law."
The court further said:
HThe word (substantially' is merely an elastic term
·which does not indicate a definite fixed amount of
percentage. At one extreme it may be said that the
transfer does not have to be 100 percent; at the other
extreme, it may be said that the transfer cannot be less
than 90 percent in the ordinary situation. (See application of Hinzmann & \Valdmann, 85 N.Y. S. 149;
Schul Trading Company vs. Commission, 95 F. (2d)
404), although a lesser amount has been considered
sufficient under a statute which is broader_ than otirs.
Harris vs. Egan, 135 Conn. 102; anno: 4 A. L. R. 2d
721. · The relation between the value of the trucking
business transfer and the value of the gasoline station
retained is not so small from either an accounting or
practical viewpoint that we can say, as a matter of law,
that substantially all of the assets of the business of
W. M. Auclair were acquired by the plaintiff. The
detern1ination by the defendant that they were not is
one that could be made upon the facts in this ~ase."
It will be noted that the Utah Act also carries a statutory
5
~quirep1ent that n9 employer may obtain a rate less than 2.7
percent (the standard r_ate) unless he had paid all cqntributions due a~d h~s filed all reports. The P~nnsylvania statute
contains a' sim~ar provision, and the Court of Common Pleas
.
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of .:Dauphin County (No.- 2 Cqmmqnwealth Dock~t 1948)
in the case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania vs. Molnar
Brothers Coal Company from the order of .Department of
Labor and Industry on the Application for Review and Readjustment of the Contribution Rate to the Unemployment
Compensation Fund, decided March, .1949, that where the
predecessor had not paid all contributions, the successor was
not entitled to a reduced rate. The court said:
((The appellant does not deny its failure to comply
with the provisions of the law, but attempts first to
excuse its failure on the ground that the Bureau would
· not help it make out its 'returns until 1947 and, secondly,
contends that the provision of paragraph ce' is in the
. nature of a penalty and as such is unreasonable and
unlawful .. ~
uWhere the appellant falls into error on its other
contention is that the tax imposed by the statute is 2. 7
percent and not the unknown and undetermined percent which the appellant would be required to pay had
it been entitled to an experience rating.
nln Albright Unemployment Compensation case, 162
Pa. Superior Ct. 98, 104 ( 1948) Judge Arnold said:
CPrior to 1943 intervenor's tax was 2.7DJo. C(Experi-.
ence rating" effected, according to a formula, and
adjustment of the contribution, which reduced this
rate, the reduction to become greater as the ((unemployment" of the employer's workmen became less.
It was a reward and not a penalty, for without uexperience rating" the employer's tax would remain at
2. 7DJo, and in the subsequent amendments of 1943
and 1945 its tax was fixed at this rate unless adjusted.'
nAs pointed out above the tax is 2. 7DJ0 unless the taxpayer meets certain requirements among which is the
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payment of all contributions prior to certain prescribed
dates which the appellant. did not do.
·
((Being ta reward and not a penalty' the principle~
relating to penalties urged upon us by the appellant
do not apply. The rate was properly set by the Bureau
for 1947 at 2.70Jo."

CONCLUSION
In conclusion the defendants in the instant case contend
that the plaintiffs have not met the statutory requirements for
the payment of a rate less than 2.7 percent-the standard rate
established by the statute-and that, therefore, their rate for
the period involved in this matter must remain at 2. 7 percent.
Respectfully submitted,

CLINTON D. VERNON
Attorney General

FRED F. DREMANN, Special
Assistant Atto1'ney General
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